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We report results of an internet experiment designed to test the
theory of informational cascades in ﬁnancial markets. More than 6000
subjects, including a subsample of 267 consultants from an interna-
tional consulting ﬁrm, participated in the experiment. As predicted
by theory, we ﬁnd that the presence of a ﬂexible market price pre-
vents herding. However, the presence of contrarian behavior, which
can (partly) be rationalized via error models, distorts prices, and even
after 20 decisions convergence to the fundamental value is rare. We
also study the eﬀects of transaction costs and the expectations of sub-
jects with respect to future prices. Finally, we look at the behavior of
various subsamples of our heterogeneous subject pool.
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According to the popular press the recent internet and technology bubble
can easily be explained. For example, Paul Farrow asserts in The Daily
Telegraph (09.01.2002) that “Investors are like lemmings”. The academic
discussion in ﬁnance, however, has long been inﬂuenced by the eﬃcient
market hypothesis (Fama, 1965, 1970), which rests on the assumption of
rational investors. Irrational investors, it is presumed, are soon parted from
their money (Friedman, 1953). Many practitioners never really believed in
the eﬃcient market hypothesis and it is now also strongly under attack on
several fronts in the academic literature.1 One question which remains open
and for various reasons is very diﬃcult to resolve with ﬁeld data is whether
herding actually occurs in ﬁnancial markets or not. In order to contribute
to this question we conducted a large—scale internet experiment based on a
sequential asset market.
Several sources of rational herding are known to the theoretical litera-
ture. For example, when market participants’ payoﬀs depend directly on
the behavior of others, herd behavior is natural. Such payoﬀ externalities
cause herding of analysts or fund managers in models of reputational herding
(e.g., Scharfstein and Stein, 1990), or herd behavior of depositors in bank
runs (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).2 Even if such payoﬀ externalities
are absent, however, herd behavior may be observed in markets through a
process of information transmission. Models based purely on informational
externalities were pioneered by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992)
(henceforth BHW), Welch (1992), and Banerjee (1992). They show that it
may be perfectly rational to ignore one’s own private information and in-
stead follow one’s predecessors. Since no further information is revealed once
such an informational cascade has started, ineﬃciencies occur even though
each individual is behaving rationally.
Theories of rational herding or informational cascades are, however, not
directly applicable to ﬁnancial markets. Market prices are a powerful mech-
anism which, in theory, eﬃciently aggregate private information of traders.
In particular, Avery and Zemsky (1998) (henceforth AZ) have shown that
informational cascades cannot occur in a simple sequential asset market be-
cause a ﬂexible market price incorporates all publicly available information.
Hence, rational traders should always follow their private signal and thereby
1For example, see DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987). For surveys, see e.g., Hirshleifer,
2001, or Barberis and Thaler, 2002.
2Within our experiment we also implemented treatments, which look at the eﬀects of
reputation or payoﬀ externalities in herding decisions. At the moment, these treatments
a r ee v a l u a t e da n dw i l lb er e p o r t e di nac o m p a n i o np a p e r .
1reveal their information.3 Note that in this class of sequential trade models
traders are only allowed to buy or sell once, and hence classical price bubbles
driven by traders, which think they can resell the asset before the bubble
bursts, are not possible.4
In reality, herding may nevertheless occur due to the likely existence
of boundedly rational traders who may be plagued by a variety of biases
and follow more or less plausible rules of thumb. Imitation, trend chas-
ing, momentum trading strategies, and the like are all alternative possible
sources for herd behavior in ﬁnancial markets. Finally, there are strategies
advocated by popular guide books and analysts that should counteract herd
behavior.5 In particular, “contrarian” or “value strategies” call for buying
assets with low prices relative to some fundamental value like earnings, div-
idends, historical prices etc. (for empirical evidence on the proﬁtability of
such strategies, see e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1994, or La Porta et al., 1998)
The internet experiment we report on in this paper was designed to ad-
dress the question whether herd or contrarian behavior dominates in experi-
mental markets. More than 6000 subjects participated in our experiment, in
which a substantial amount of prize money was at stake. The subject pool
was exceptionally educated with more than 13% holding a Ph.D. and an-
other 31% being Ph.D. students. Almost half the subjects were educated in
natural sciences, mathematics, or engineering. We also conducted a control
experiment with 267 consultants of an international consulting ﬁrm. The
main treatments in this experiment were variants of the basic model by AZ in
which a market price aggregates all publicly available information. Traders
received a private signal and could observe the past history of prices and in
most treatments additionally the decisions of their predecessors. The large
number of participants in the experiment allowed us to introduce a variety of
modiﬁcations of the basic model. For example, we explored many diﬀerent
combinations of a priori probabilities and signal precisions to check for ro-
bustness. We also looked at the eﬀects of two diﬀerent levels of transaction
costs. For comparison, we also conducted treatments without market prices
corresponding to the basic model of BHW. Finally, an important benchmark
is a treatment in which subjects could not only observe the decisions of their
predecessors but also their private signals. In this treatment, doubts about
3AZ show that herding may occur in the presence of multi—dimensional uncertainty,
even though informational cascades remain impossible. See also Cipriani and Guarino
(2001) for other modiﬁcations of the AZ model that make herds possible.
4For a survey of theories of rational bubbles and herding, see e.g., Brunnermeier (2001).
For a survey of experimental research on bubbles in asset markets, see e.g., Sunder (1995).
For recent work in this area, see e.g., Hommes et al. (2002), or Hey and Morone (2002).
5See e.g. the investment classic Contrarian Investment Strategies by Dreman (1979,
1998) or his column “The Contrarian” in Forbes Magazine.
2the rationality of others can not be an issue.
The main objectives of this paper are, ﬁrst, a test of the theory of in-
formational cascades in ﬁnancial markets taking the theory at face value by
implementing a design that exactly matches the theoretical set—up. Second,
we are interested in ﬁltering out empirical regularities that may explain pos-
sible deviations from the theory. In particular, we want to ﬁnd out whether
traders follow their own signal (which is rational if all others are rational
too), whether they engage in herd behavior, or whether they follow con-
trarian strategies by trading against their signal and the market. Third, we
study the eﬀect of transactions costs which, from a theoretical point of view,
can prevent convergence of the price to its true value. Finally, an important
issue is also what expectations subjects hold with respect to future prices,
in particular, whether traders understand the (theoretical) martingale prop-
erty of prices. For this purpose, we asked some subjects to bet on the ﬁnal
price of the asset.
Our experiment complements a large empirical literature with ﬁeld data.
Beginning with Lakonishok et al. (1992) researchers were analyzing the
tendency of fund managers, security analysts (Welch, 2000), or investment
newsletters (Graham, 1999) to herd (for surveys, see e.g., Bikhchandani and
Sharma, 2000, Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2002, or Daniel et al., 2002). However,
as Hirshleifer and Teoh (2002) note, it will always be diﬃcult to empirically
disentangle the mixture of reputational eﬀects, informational eﬀects, direct
payoﬀ externalities, and imperfect rationality. Since the private information
of market participants is unobservable, theory cannot be tested directly.
Thus, one has to rule out incidental clustering of actions due to similar
strategies (e.g. in reaction to price movements), or due to common infor-
mation. Experiments oﬀer an opportunity to directly test herding theories
since all fundamentals and private information of agents are under control
of the experimenter.
Following Anderson and Holt (1997) there is by now a well established
experimental literature on cascade and herding models.6 However, to our
knowledge there is only one other experiment on cascades in ﬁnancial mar-
kets with ﬂexible prices which has been conducted by Cipriani and Guarino
(2002).7 Their design follows closely that by Anderson and Holt (1997) in
6See e.g. Allsopp and Hey (1999), Ashiya and Doi (2001) , Bounmy et al. (1998),
Goidel and Shields (1994), Huck and Oechssler (2000), Hung and Plott (2001), Kr¨ amer
et al. (2000), K¨ ubler and Weizs¨ acker (2001), N¨ oth and Weber (2002), N¨ oth et al. (2001),
Oberhammer and Stiehler (2001), Plott and Yang (1997), Sadiraj et al. (1999), Willinger
and Ziegelmeyer (1998).
7When we conducted our experiment, we were not aware of the paper by Cipriani and
Guarino (2002). However, it is clear that their experiment has precedence.
3that subjects could observe other subjects taking decisions, and private in-
formation was framed as a draw from an urn. Some of our treatments are
very close to their experiment, and we will comment at several places in this
paper on their results.
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the
theoretical predictions for the basic BHW model without prices and for the
AZ model with market prices. In Section 3, we describe the experimental
design, in particular the diﬀerent treatments, the recruitment, the charac-
teristics of the subject pool, and the implementation on the internet.8
The results of the experiment are presented in Section 4. Maybe the
most important result is that we ﬁnd no evidence of herding or imitative
behavior in the presence of a ﬂexible market price. While this aspect is
consistent with the AZ model, the other theoretical predictions of the AZ
model ﬁnd no support in the data. Recall that the AZ model predicts
that all subjects follow their private information. In the experiment this
happens only in between 50 and 70 % of cases. Clearly, such behavior yields
substantial deviations of actual prices from theoretical prices which would
obtain if everyone behaved rationally. We ﬁnd that, on average, actual
prices are less extreme than theoretical prices which implies that volatility
in the actual market is lower than it should be theoretically. In light of
the popular view that irrational traders are partly responsible for the large
swings observed in ﬁnancial markets, this is an interesting ﬁnding. While
we do not observe herding, we ﬁnd considerable support for the existence
of “contrarian” behavior. When the price of asset A is high, subjects often
buy asset B even if their own private information and the decisions of their
predecessors favor asset A, and vice versa. Since we ﬁnd that contrarian
behavior can be proﬁtable at very low or very high prices, we explore the
possibility that subjects have doubts about the rationality of others and
consequently mistrust their decisions. We ﬁnd that error models (as in the
quantal response models of McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995 and 1997), which
explicitly take into account the possibility of mistakes, are partly able to
rationalize contrarian behavior.
The large number of participants allows us further to conduct a number
of interesting comparisons of behavior with respect to demographics, ﬁelds
of studies etc. There seems to be no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between male and
8Conducting experiments on the internet is still novel. For ﬁrst experiences, see e.g.,
Forsythe et al. (1992, 1999), Lucking-Reiley (1999), Nagel et al. (1999) , Anderhub et al.
(2001), Charness et al. (2001), Shavit et al. (2001), G¨ uth et al. (2002). Some of these
papers discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this technique. For technical issues,
see e.g., Greiner et al. (2002). The internet is also used to provide a platform to run
economic experiments for interactive learning (Holt, 2002).
4female subjects, or between subjects with and without college education.
Ph.D.’s and Ph.D. students, however, performed slightly better in terms
of rationality. Maybe it does not come as a surprise that when we look
at selected ﬁelds of studies, physicists and mathematicians perform best in
terms of “rationality” (i.e. performance according to theory) and psychol-
ogists worst. However, since “rational” behavior is only proﬁtable when
other subjects also behave rationally, good performance in terms of ratio-
nality does not imply good performance in terms of proﬁts. And indeed, the
ranking in terms of proﬁts is just the opposite: psychologists are best and
physicists are worst.9 Finally, it is reassuring that the consultants in our
control experiment did not behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the subjects
in the main experiment, which is important for the outside validity of our
experiment. Section 5 contains a conclusion.
2 Theoretical predictions
Consider a number of investors who have to decide sequentially whether to
invest in one of two assets, A or B. For simplicity each investor can only
buy either one unit of asset A or one unit of asset B (sometimes we also
allow for the possibility that no trade occurs). Investors are risk neutral and
have the same a priori beliefs regarding the probabilities of success of the
two investments. Speciﬁcally, only one asset is successful and worth 10 units
at the end of the period while the other is worth 0. Each investor believes
ap r i o r it h a ta s s e tA’s probability of success is P(A).
The timing is as follows. Investors move squentially in some exogenous
order with each investor moving only once. Before deciding what to buy each
investor receives a private, informative signal a or b regarding the success
of the assets. The signal’s precision is P(a|A)=P(b|B) > 0.5, which is the
conditional probability that signal s = a (b) is given when the true state
is S = A (B). For all investors, the signal is identically and independently
distributed conditional on the true state. This is commonly known. Each
investor can observe the decisions of all his predecessors.
We consider two principal versions of this model: one in which the prices
for the two assets are ﬁxed (and normalized to zero) and one in which the
prices are market prices that reﬂect publicly available information. The
version with zero prices is equivalent to the basic model studied by BHW.
The model with market prices has been studied by AZ.
9Luckily, economists’ performance turns out to be closer to psychologists than to physi-
cists. The results across ﬁelds of studies should be taken with a grain of salt as the
diﬀerences, despite being substantial on average, are not statistically signiﬁcant.
52.1 The BHW model
All investors can invest either in asset A or B — but not both — at zero
cost. Clearly, an investor with t predecessors will choose A if and only if
the conditional probability that A is successful given all private and public
information P(A|Ht,s) is greater than 1/2,10 where Ht denotes the observ-
able history of the decisions of all predecessors up to round t,a n ds = a,b
the private signal.
The diﬃculty lies in the interpretation of decisions of predecessors. As-
suming that all predecessors are perfectly rational Bayesians, an investor
who is a Bayesian himself follows his private signal and thereby reveals it,
unless an informational cascade has started. Such signals are called imputed
signals.
A cascade on asset S,a nS—cascade, starts when an investor should buy
asset S regardless of his own signal, i.e. when P(S|Ht,s) > 1/2, for s = a,b.
Depending on the a priori probabilities and the signal precisions this requires
ad i ﬀerent number of (imputed) a or b signals. In all cases, however, the
onset of a cascade depends only on the net number of signals ∆ =# a−#b
which can be imputed from the history of decisions (i.e., ∆ is deﬁned net of
the signal of the current investor).
We demonstrate the calculations for our main probability combination
55-60, that is, P(A)=0 .55 and P(a|A)=P(b|B)=0 .6. The ﬁrst in-
vestor should always follow his own signal since even if he receives a b-signal
P(B|b)=1−P(A|b) > 1/2 holds. Hence, the signal of the ﬁrst player can be
imputed from his action. If the ﬁrst investor chooses A, the second should
already disregard his own signal: even with a b signal, the second investor





which is the a priori probability for A. The two signals a and b cancel
out and the decision should follow the a priori probability. In this case the
third player cannot impute the signal of the second player and thus faces
a similar decision problem as the second player. Hence after one A, an A—
cascade starts, i.e. when ∆ ≥ 1.L i k e w i s ei tc a nb es h o w nt h a taB—cascade
must start for ∆ ≤− 2. If all agents are rational Bayesians, a cascade is
never broken once it started, and information accumulation stops.
In an experiment, one can hardly assume that all subjects are rational
Bayesians, let alone that all subjects believe that all other subjects are ratio-
10In most of our treatments, ties in expected proﬁtc a n n o to c c u r .W h e nat i e — b r a k i n g
rule is required, it is mentioned explicitly below.
6nal. In particular, one has to make provisions for the fact that irrational be-
havior may be unambiguously observed (as when the second subject chooses
B following an A by the ﬁrst subject in the example above).
To account for possible non—Bayesian behavior we assume that subjects
impute signals in the following way. If a decision is not in obvious contradic-
tion to Bayes’ rule, the imputed signal equals the decision unless a cascade
has started, in which case no signal can be extracted from the respective de-
cision. For a decision which, given the history of imputed signals, obviously
violates Bayes’ rule, we considered two variants: a) successors ignore the
decision of the deviator and b) subjects assume that the deviator followed
his private signal. As it turns out, the empirical truth lies somewhere in the
middle but both assumptions yield qualitatively the same results. In the
following, we only reports results based on rule (b). We say that an agent
is “rational” if he follows Bayesian updating with respect to the imputed
signal history and his own signal.11
Of course, no ambiguity with regard to rationality arises when not only
decisions but also signals of others are observable. In this case an optimal
decision is purely a matter of calculating conditional probabilities. We also
consider this possibility in one treatment.
2.2 The Avery/Zemsky model
To keep our experiment as simple as possible, we consider the simplest
version of the AZ model (cf. Avery and Zemsky, 1998, Section I), which is
the BHW model enriched by a ﬂexible price. In this simple model, the price
is set by a market maker who eﬃciently incorporates all publicly available
information.12 The crucial question is how the existence of a market price
changes the possibilities for herding.
Let pt denote the market price of asset A in round t and assume that a
successful asset pays out 10 units in the end. Hence,
pt = 10P(A|Ht).
11The reader should note that “rationality” here, and in the following, is just short
terminology for behavior in line with theory under the assumption that predecessors were
rational too.
12In contrast to AZ’s general model which is in the spirit of Glosten and Milgrom (1985),
the simple model does not incorporate uninformed traders and therefore has no bid—ask
spread. With only informed traders, setting a bid—ask spread to ensure a zero proﬁt
condition for the market maker would lead to a market breakdown. However, the results
of the simple model carry over to a more complex world with informed and uninformed
traders and a market maker setting bid—ask spreads (see AZ, Proposition 3). As in the
experiment the market maker was played by the computer, the possibility of losses was
not an issue.
7The price of B is always equal to 10 − pt since P(A|Ht)=1 − P(B|Ht).
The decision of an investor is straightforward. An investment in A is
proﬁtable in expectation if and only if
10P(A|Ht,s) − pt > 0
that is, if and only if s = a. Likewise, an investment in B is proﬁtable if
and only if s = b. In other words, each investor follows his private signal.
All information is revealed, and therefore it is incorporated into the price
immediately after each decision. This implies that the price is semi-strong
eﬃcient, i.e., at any point in time the price incorporates all publicly available
information.13 The price is a martingale with respect to public information,
i.e. E(pt+1|Ht)=pt for all t and one cannot take advantage of the knowledge
of historical price movements to earn superior returns. As everyone follows
his signal, rational herding cannot occur.
Note that not trading is never optimal unless one introduces transaction
costs because subjects always have an informational advantage over the
market maker. At some prices transaction cost induce rational agents not
to trade irrespective of their signal. Once such a price is reached the market
breaks down since no rational agent will buy anymore and market prices
remain constant. Thus in the presence of transaction costs the market price
need not converge to the true value of the asset and even in the long run
substantial mispricing is possible. In the presence of a ﬂexible market price,
we say that an agent is “rational” if he follows his signal, or does not trade
if transaction costs are too high, respectively.14
Again, the problem becomes more complicated when investors cannot be
fully conﬁdent that their predecessors behaved rationally. Suppose instead
the investor believes that (some) prior decisions were taken randomly. A
regression to the mean argument shows that high prices are likely to be
overvalued and low prices undervalued. Thus, it may pay for an investor
to trade against the market and against one’s own signal. Such investors
are called contrarians even though rational contrarians would never occur
in our setting if all investors were known to be rational.
13The notion of informationally eﬃcient markets goes back to Fama (1965) . Later on
this notion has been expressed in three diﬀerent forms: the weak form (implying that the
price process is a random walk), the semi-strong form and the strong form (stating that
prices incorporate all public and private information).
14Recall Footnote 11. With respect to the price setting rule, we assume that the market
maker holds the belief that all decisions are formed rationally unless this can be unam-
bigiously rejected. Given an irrational no trade decision, no signal can be imputed, and
the price remains constant. If the market maker unambigiously observes an irrational A
or B d e c i s i o n( t h i sc a no n l yh a p p e ni nt h ep r e s e n c eo ft r a n s a c t i o nc o s tw h e nn ot r a d ei s
rational) the market maker holds the belief that the decision reﬂects the agent’s signal.
83 Experimental design
More than 6000 subjects participated in our online experiment which was
available for a period of about six weeks in the spring of 2002 on our web
site http://www.a-oder-b.de w h i c hi sG e r m a nf o ra-or-b. Subjects decided in
sequence and were able to observe the actual decisions of prior participants
in their respective groups. In general, the group size was 20. Subjects were
asked to make decisions in three independent groups, thus in total there
were more than 18000 decisions. We call the ﬁrst decision stage 1,t h e
second stage 2, etc.
Common to all treatments are the following features. Subjects had to
choose between investment opportunities A and B (in some price treatments,
there was also the option of choosing neither which we label N). Only one
of the two could be successful and, if so, would pay 10 “Lotto—Euros”.
The unsuccessful investment paid nothing. Subjects were told the a priori
probabilities P(S), which varied among our treatments. Furthermore, they
were told that they would receive a tip by an investment banker which was
reliable with a speciﬁed probability P(s|S), which also varied among our
treatments. Subjects were informed that all prior investors in their group
had received a tip by other investment bankers and that these tips were
independent of theirs (see the Appendix for a translation of the instructions).
In the next subsection we introduce the details of the diﬀerent treat-
ments.
3.1 Treatments
Given the large number of participants we were able to explore a variety of
diﬀerent questions, information conditions, probability combinations, etc..
In this paper, we focus on treatments that are relevant to ﬁnancial markets,
that is, treatments which follow the basic set up of AZ where a market price
exists which reﬂects all public available information. For comparisons, we
also include two treatments without prices which follow the basic model of
BHW.
Table 1 lists the main features of all treatments. Treatment names with
market prices start with P followed by +D when, additional to the price his-
tory, the decisions of all prior investors are observable, or -D when only the
price history is observable. Hence, in treatments +D subjects could observe
which eﬀects decisions had on prices. A -N denotes treatments in which
the “no trade” option was absent, i.e. subjects were forced to buy either
A or B. If all agents act in line with theory the diﬀerent price treatments




PP + D Price, all decisions observable∗
P-D Price, no decisions observable
Pe+D Price, explicit formulation, all decisions observable∗
P-N P+D-N Price, all decisions observable, N not possible∗
P-D-N Price, no decisions observable, N not possible
P+Ti P+D+Ti P+D + transactions costs of size i
Pe+D+Ti Pe+D + transactions costs of size i
BHW Bikhchandani/Hirshleifer/Welch
BHW+AS BHW + all signals observable
Notes: N denotes the option of not trading. ∗ these treatments also oﬀered the
option of placing a bet on the ﬁnal price in the respective group.
should follows his own signal. Whether past decisions are observable or not
is irrelevant since the price history fully reveals past decisions such that the
decision history yields no additional information. Furthermore, the no—trade
option N should not alter the result because in the absence of transaction
costs, not trading is never optimal. In treatments where transaction costs
are present +Ti is added to the treatment name. There were two levels of
transaction costs: i ∈ {0.1,0.5}
To explain the notion of an eﬃcient market price to subjects is not a sim-
ple task. To check whether a more explicit description of the price process
makes a diﬀerence we included treatments which additionally mentioned
that prices are conditional expected values given the history of decisions.
Such treatments are denoted by an additional e.15 Finally, treatments with-
out prices are denoted by BHW. The no—price treatment in which also all
signals of predecessors were observable is denoted by BHW+AS.
While in the price treatments cascades should never happen regardless
of the probability parameters of the model, in the no—price treatments the
likelihood of cascades crucially depends on the a priori probability of the
true state and the precision of the private signals. We have therefore looked
at a number of diﬀerent probability combinations shown in Table 2. The last
two columns in Table 2 give the net number of imputed signals necessary
15We have also used two versions of the instructions: text1 and text2, the latter being
more precise about the independence of the investment bankers’ tips. See Section 4.10 for
more on this.
10Table 2: Probabilities
a priori prob. P(A)s i g n a l p r e c i s i o n P(a|A) ∆ A—cascade ∆ B—cascade
55 60 1 −2
51 55 1 −2
55 80 1 −2
50∗ 66 2 −2
60∗ 60 1 −3
60 51 −9 −12
60 55 −1 −4
Note: * tie-braking rule: follow own signal when indiﬀerent.
for the start of an A or B cascade, respectively.
Payoﬀs in “Lotto—Euros” were calculated as follows. If a subject chose
the correct investment, he received 10 Lotto—Euros. This was the ﬁnal pay-
oﬀ for this task in the BHW treatments. In the price treatments subjects
received additionally an endowment of 11 for each task to avoid losses be-
cause they had to pay the market price for their investment (which could
vary between 0 and 10) and in some treatments the transaction costs of
0.1 or 0.5. Thus, the payoﬀ from each task was 11− market price + 10( i f
successful) − transaction costs (if applicable).
From the perspective of eﬃc i e n tm a r k e tt h e o r yi ti sn o to n l yi n t e r e s t i n g
whether the price incorporates all information eﬃciently but also whether
subjects perceive the price to be a martingale. Therefore, treatments P+D,
Pe+D and P+D-N oﬀered an additional chance to make money by placing a
bet ˆ pT+1 on the market price pT+1 for asset A in this group, i.e. the market
price after the last player in the group had made his decision.16 This “price
b e t ”w a sr e w a r d e da sf o l l o w s :
max[5 − |ˆ pT+1 − pT+1|,0]. (1)
Given that the theoretical price is a martingale, rational players should set
ˆ pT+1 equal to the expected value of A given the observed history and their
signal.
16The bet was oﬀered to subjects after they took their decission but without revealing
the new price.
113.2 Recruiting and payment
The experiment was announced in several ads in the science section of the
largest German weakly newspaper Die Zeit, two popular science magazines,
and two national student magazines. Posters were distributed at most sci-
ences faculties at German universities. Finally, emails were sent to Ph.D.
students and postdocs in science and economics departments at 35 universi-
ties in Germany. The web site www.a-oder-b.de was linked to the Laboratory
for Experimental Research in Economics at the University of Bonn and to
the sponsor McKinsey & Company to demonstrate that the experiment had
a proper scientiﬁc background and that the promised ﬁnancial rewards were
credible.
All payoﬀs in the experiment were denoted in “Lotto—Euro”. Each
Lotto—Euro was a ticket in a lottery for 11 prizes of 1000 Euro each. While
the odds in those lotteries were ﬁxed in advance and known to subjects,
they were diminishing over time. In phase I of the experiment, 1409 sub-
jects played with high powered incentives where each of 40000 lottery tickets
had an equal chance of winning one of 5 prizes of 1000 Euros. Since sub-
jects played on average for about 15 minutes, they were making an expected
hourly “wage” of 14.19 Euros, which is comparable to a very good student
job and to pay in laboratory experiments. In phase II, each of 90000 lot-
tery tickets had an equal chance of winning one of another 5 prizes of 1000
Euros. Finally, in phase III, all remaining 1162 subjects competed for the
last 1000 Euros which amounted to almost no monetary incentive. This
payment scheme was due to the fact that an unexpected large number of
subjects participated in our experiment. But it also gives us the chance to
test the role of incentives in such a setting. The 11 winners were notiﬁed
by mail 2 weeks after the experiment ended and their prize money was paid
through bank transfers.
Additionally, there was a control group of 267 consultants of an inter-
national consulting ﬁrm who participated in the experiment on the same
web site a couple of weeks before the start of the actual experiment. The
subjects of the control experiment were recruited by an internal email to
all German consultants of this ﬁrm. Subjects knew that all other subjects
were also consultants. About a third of those addressed participated. These
subjects had the chance to win 8 vouchers for a nice dinner for two in a
restaurant each worth 150 Euros.
3.3 Subject pool
In total, 6099 subjects ﬁnished our experiment of which 5832 subjects par-
ticipated in the main experiment and 267 in the control experiment with
12Table 3: Properties of the subject pool
Average age 28.3
% of female subjects 27.8
% completed (at least) ﬁrst university degree 56.9
% current students 36.4
% non—students 6.7
% completed Ph.D. 13.7
% current Ph.D. students 31.3
consultants.17 Table 3 lists some of the main characteristics of the com-
bined subject pool (including the control experiment with consultants).
In contrast to most experiments in economics, our subjects come from
a broad range of ﬁelds. Figure 1 shows the frequencies of the main subject
groups. Each bar in Figure 1 shows the number of subjects who study for or
have ﬁnished a ﬁrst degree, the number of subjects who currently are Ph.D.
students, and the number of subjects who have ﬁnished a Ph.D.18 Consid-
ering the number of Ph.D. students and Ph.D.’s we believe we succeeded in
recruiting a fairly bright subject pool.
3.4 Implementation
When arriving on our web site, subjects read a screen that introduced the
general problem and the rules of the game. Subsequently, subjects were
asked for some personal information, like name, mailing address, email, ﬁeld
of study, age etc., and subjects were only allowed to play if all information
requested was actually provided. This was also a measure to prevent subjects
from playing twice: in order to win in the lottery, one had to give a correct
mailing address, and the program ensured that the same name-postal code
combination as well as the same email address could only play once. We
also used cookies to prevent using the same computer twice.19
17788 individuals logged on but did not ﬁnish the experiment. Their decisions were
not included in the history Ht since they did not face monetary incentives (payment was
conditional on ﬁnishing all three stages of the experiment).
18Given that each time when we sent out an email to Ph.D. students and post-docs to
advertise the experiment, there was immediately a peak in access to our webpage, one can
be conﬁdent in these numbers.
19It will never be possible to completely prevent that clever people manage to play
more than once. However, we are conﬁdent that not many such attempts were successful,




































Figure 1: Composition of the subject pool (“Sciences” includes physics,
chemistry, mathematics, and computer science; “Economics” includes eco-
nomics, business administration and related subjects; “Medicine” includes
medicine, psychology, and dentistry; “Liberal Arts” includes all languages,
history, and pedagogy. “Misc.” stands for miscellaneous ﬁelds)
After entering the personal information, subjects were randomly placed
in a currently active group,20 and had to make their ﬁrst decision. After-
wards they were randomly placed in another active group for the second task
a n dt h e ni nat h i r dg r o u pf o rt h eﬁnal task. No feedback about results was
given until the subject had completed all three tasks, and even then they
were only told how many ”Lotto—Euro” they had won. Usually the tasks for
each subject came from diﬀerent treatments. Finally, we asked subjects for
voluntary feedback as to how they formed their decision, and 687 subjects
sent response emails.
out that less than 5% of the participants entered an invalid email address (including
unintentional typos), and these subjects did not behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
20Ag r o u pw a sactive when it was neither full nor closed (i.e., when another subject was
active in this group). We also ensured that subjects who logged on at about the same
time were allocated to diﬀerent treatments to prevent “observational learning” in case two
s u b j e c t ss a tn e x tt oe a c ho t h e ri nac o m p u t e rp o o l .
144R e s u l t s
For the evaluation of the results we shall consider the following 4 measures.
(1) Average rational behavior (rat)i sd e ﬁned as the fraction of subjects who
behaved rationally.21 (2) The fraction of cases in which subjects rationally
decided against their own signal if they are in a cascade is denoted by casc.
Arguably, casc is a harder test for cascade theories since rat includes all
the cases in which subjects (rationally) follow their own signal. (3) The
fraction of cases in which subjects followed their own signal is denoted by
own. (4) Finally, the actual market price pt is compared to the theoretical
price p∗
t, which would have resulted had all subjects decided rationally, and
to the full-information price pF
t , which would result if the market maker
could directly observe the signals.
Before we present the results it might be useful to collect the theoretical
hypotheses for our various treatments.
1.I na l lP and P-N treatments subjects should follow their own signal
→ rat = own = 1.
2. There should not be any diﬀerence between any of the treatments in
P and P-N, regardless of whether prior decisions are observable or not
(+D or -D) and whether the option N was available or not.
3. In treatments with end price bets subjects should always bet the ex-
pected value of A given the observed history and their signal.
4. Actual prices pt should match theoretical prices p∗
t.
5. The only instances in which no trade (N)s h o u l db eo b s e r v e di si nt h e
transaction cost treatments (P+T) and even there only in some well
deﬁned circumstances.
6. In treatment BHW subjects should follow the cascade behavior de-
scribed in the last two columns of Table 2 if they believe that their
predecessors were rational → rat = casc = 1.
7. In treatment BHW+AS subjects should follow the cascade behavior of
Table 2 regardless of what they believe about others ⇒ rat = casc = 1.
8. Diﬀerent prior probabilities and signal precisions should not alter av-
erage rationality rat.
21Recall the deﬁnition of rationality above and Footnote 11
15Table 4: Number of groups for treatments
probability combination total
treatment 50-66 51-55 55-60 55-80 60-51 60-55 60-60 C55-60
P+D 1262 68 - 6 4 157 7
P-D 11 62 01 --395 0
Pe+D 126126 - 6 - - 4 2
P+D-N 16618 ---- -4 0
P-D-N 17618 ---- -4 1
P+D+T0.1 1262 08 - 6 4 - 5 6
P+D+T0.5 12 6 26 2 - - 4 24 74
Pe+D+T0.1 ---6-6- -12
Pe+D+T0.5 12612 ---- -3 0
BHW 12 176 5 8 12615 15 150
BHW+AS 12 187 0 2 12-129 135
total 128 83 287 41 24 30 42 72 701
Note: As a convention the ﬁrst number in x-y is the prior and the second the signal
precision used in the experiment. C55-60 denotes groups in the control experiment
with consultants.
4.1 Preliminary data analysis
As stated above the number of subjects that decided in sequence was usually
20 (it was 10f o rBHW+AS treatments and the control experiment with
consultants). Table 4 gives the number of groups that participated in our
experiment, separately for each combination of treatments and probabilities.
Since reporting result for each variation would be tedious, we checked
ﬁrst which variants of our treatments can be grouped together and pooled.
We did this by comparing treatments with respect to the variables rat and
own both by non—parametric tests and regressions taking each group as one
observation. The following summarizes the results of those tests:
• The phase of the experiment (recall that incentives were diﬀerent in
phases I, II, and III) had no signiﬁcant eﬀect. This implies that — at
least in this experiment — incentives seem to matter little as compared
to the intrinsic motivation of subjects to perform well.22
22Camerer and Hogarth (1999) provide a survey of studies which look at the eﬀects of
monetary incentives.
16• The stage of the task (whether a task was the ﬁrst, second, or third a
subject performed in) did not matter except in transaction cost treat-
ments (see Section 4.7). This shows that learning eﬀects do not play
as i g n i ﬁcant role which is in line with our expectations given that
subjects did not receive any feedback until the end of the game.
• The two versions of the instructions (see Footnote 15) made no sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence. Also, a more explicit formulation for the price
formation process (e) was irrelevant which, given that a large fraction
of the subject pool has a mathematical background (see Figure 1), is
reassuring as to that subjects understood how prices were formed.
• Treatments that belong to the same treatment group (see Table 1)w e r e
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. In particular, the observability of decision
of predecessors did not matter which implies that subjects understood
that their predecessors’ decisions are reﬂected in the price history.
Henceforth, unless otherwise stated, we will pool data from treatment
variants that did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer. In the following, we will present
the results from the main experiment. Results from the control experiment
with consultants are reported in Section 4.10.
4.2 Summary statistics
In this subsection, we present summary statistics on the main variables of
interest, rat, casc, and own.23 Recall that theory predicts rat = 1 for all
treatments, own = 1 in price treatments, and casc = 1 in BHW treatments.
Figure 2 shows average rationality (rat) for 5 treatment groups and the
probability combination 55—60.24 Average rationality is quite low in BHW
with only 65% of subjects behaving according to Bayesian rationality under
the assumption that other subjects are rational too. Even in BHW+AS,
where there is no need to worry about the rationality of others, rat reaches
only 72%.
In some price treatments, however, rationality is even lower, partly be-
cause an additional mistake can be made, namely not to trade. Thus, in
the P+N and P+T treatments rationality is lowest with 55% and 50%, re-
spectively. In fact, N was chosen on average 20% of the time in the P+N
23All results of this paper are derived by using SPSS 10.
24Since in the BHW treatments the observed rat varies with diﬀerent probability com-
binations, we compare treatments only for our main probability combination 55—60.
17treatments,25 which was never rational. With transaction cost, N was cho-
sen 26% of the time but only 12% of the no trade decisions were rational. In
the P-N treatments, in which no trade was not an option, average rationality
reaches 66%.










Figure 2: Average rational behavior (probability combination 55-60)
Non—parametric MWU—tests reveal that rationality is signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent between all treatments at the 1% level except between P and P+T
w h e r ei ti ss i g n i ﬁcant at the 5% level and between BHW and P-N,w h e r e
it is not signiﬁcant at all. The latter ﬁnding shows that it is not so much
the diﬀerent treatments but rather the additional N option which lowers
rationality. This is supported by the ﬁnding that average rationality among
subjects who bought either A or B is 67% in treatments P as well as in
P+T.
In Figure 3 where we consider the fraction of subjects who followed their
own signal (own) a curious pattern emerges. In the BHW treatments more
than 70 % of subjects follow their own signal (often in contrast to what they
should do). On the other hand, in the treatments P and P-N only between
50% and 66% of subjects follow their own signal, when following the own
signal is always rational. The diﬀerence between the BHW and each price
25These ﬁndings are in line with Cipriani and Guarino (2002): in their ﬂexible price
treatment (given their probability combination 50-70) they report that 62.7% (23.8%) of
subjects acted rationally (did not trade) which is comparable to our treatments P given
the probability combination 50-66 where the respective numbers are 59.4% and 24.4%.
18treatment is signiﬁcant at the 1% level according to MWU tests.










Figure 3: Fraction of subjects who follow their own signal (probability com-
bination 55-60)
Finally, we can take a more detailed look how rat, own and casc vary
for diﬀerent probability combinations. Table 5 lists the respective measures
separately for each probability combination played with BHW treatments.
Note that probability combinations 60-51 and 60-55 are fairly extreme
since the a priori probabilities are larger than signal precisions. This implies
that already the ﬁrst subject should disregard a b signal and an A—cascade
should start right away. For example, in 60-51 a ∆ of −10p l u sab signal are
required to rationally choose B (which never happened). Hence, it is not
surprising that rat and casc are higher for these probability combinations.
Rather, it is surprising that they are not much higher still.
In the price treatment average rationality (which, in the absence of trans-
action costs, coincides with own) varies by less. Figure 4 shows average
rationality levels for treatment P. Taking our main treatment 55-60 as base,
only 50-66 shows a signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 5% level according to MWU
tests.26 Hence, results from the price treatments seem to be fairly robust
across probability combinations.
26Diﬀerences across probability combinations look similar in treatment P-N .
19Table 5: BHW treatments
prob. combinations BHW BHW+AS
rat own casc rat own casc
50-66 0.71 0.75 0.45 0.73 0.69 0.62
51-55 0.67 0.73 0.38 0.72 0.77 0.38
55-60 0.65 0.75 0.34 0.72 0.74 0.45
55-80 0.75 0.81 0.39 0.79 0.71 0.67
60-51 0.83 0.57 0.77 0.77 0.62 0.65
60-55 0.78 0.62 0.69 - - -
60-60 0.62 0.69 0.38 0.63 0.63 0.44
4.3 Actual versus theoretical prices
The key question with respect to the eﬃcient market hypothesis is whether
prices accurately reﬂect the information in the market. Clearly, informa-
tional eﬃciency presupposes that individual traders act rationally on their
information and, as we have seen in the last subsections, this is not always
the case in our experiment. Consequently, in this subsection we want to look
at how strongly prices are distorted relative to two theoretical benchmarks.
We deﬁne the theoretical price p∗
tas the price that would have resulted
if all traders had behaved rationally. For P and P-N the theoretical price
is equivalent to the full-information price pF
t , i.e. the price the market
maker sets if he could directly observe the signals. In treatment P+T the
theoretical and full—information prices may diﬀer as in this treatment it can
be rational to choose N. While in the long—run the full—information price will
converge to the true value of the asset, this is not necessarily the case in the
short or medium—run. Also note that in treatment P+T even in the long-
run the theoretical price need not converge to the true value because once
it is rational to choose N, it is also rational for all successors to choose N,
and hence the theoretical price remains stuck at the respective level which
may not even be in the direction of the true value. To judge how well
actual prices incorporate available information we look at two measures:
convergence of ﬁnal prices to full information ﬁnal prices, and diﬀerences
between theoretical and actual prices over time.
Figure 5 shows the fractions of actual ﬁnal prices pT+1, i.e. prices after
the decision of the last player, which were within an interval of ±1 (±0.5,
respectively) of the ﬁnal full-information prices, pF
T+1. As can be seen, ﬁnal
prices are rarely close to the ﬁnal full information price. In P-N the ﬁnal
price is within ±1 of the full information price in only 21% of groups. The










Figure 4: Average rational behavior across probability combinations (treat-
ment P)
option of not trading makes things worse since now only 14% of end prices
are close to full information prices. As can be expected this percentage, is
even lower with transactions costs.27
To have a closer look at convergence properties we focus on treatment P
for the remainder of this subsection. Results are qualitatively the same for
P-N.T h ee ﬀects of transaction costs on convergence are discussed in more
detail in Section 4.7.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the deviation (p∗
T+1 − pT+1)o ft h e
ﬁnal price of asset A from the ﬁnal theoretical price of asset A separately
for states where asset A is successful (left panel) and where B is successful
(right panel). Recall that the price of B is 10m i n u st h ep r i c eo fA.A n
important observation is that theoretical prices tend to be more extreme
than actual prices. In other words, actual prices undershoot: when state A
(B) is true, the actual ﬁnal price of A is often too low (high).
In contrast to Figure 6, Figure 7 looks at the empirical distribution of
actual prices (upper panel) and theoretical prices (lower panel) over time.28
Unless the signal precision is very high (as with probability combination
55-80), theoretical prices are concentrated around the a priori price. The
distribution of actual prices matches this feature well but the distributions
27However, only the diﬀerence between P-N and P+T (P) for +/-0.5 is signiﬁcant at
the 1% (10%) level of a MWU-test.
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Figure 5: Fraction of ﬁnal prices within ±1 and ±0.5 of the ﬁnal full infor-
mation price (pooled over all probability combinations)
are even more concentrated. Extreme prices are rarely observed. It is in-
teresting to see that even though a high fraction of subjects play seemingly
irrational, the volatility in the actual markets is less than the volatility in
theoretical markets. This holds for all probability combinations and is sig-
niﬁcant in ﬁve cases.29
That deviations between the theoretical and actual price can be severe
is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 8 which shows the average deviation
(p∗
t −pt) across theoretical prices p∗
t (not only ﬁnal ones). The graph clearly
indicates that actual prices undershoot and are less extreme than the theo-
retical prediction. Since the same signal imbalance has very diﬀerent eﬀects
on the price level in the diﬀerent probability combinations, we also plot the
average deviation for a given theoretical signal imbalances ∆ in the right
panel of Figure 8, which shows this relationship even more clearly.
Finally, over time deviations become more severe. The left panel of
Figure 9 shows that the average absolute price deviation increases. Note
that by construction of the price mechanism, deviations in the early rounds
must be small. More interestingly, there is no inverted U-shape form which
would indicate convergence over time. Rather the opposite is the case (see
right panel of Figure 9).30
29The diﬀerence in 50-66 and 60-60 has a p—value of 0.11.
30The observed divergence over time may explain the higher levels of convergence re-
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Figure 6: Distribution of the deviation of the ﬁnal price of asset A from the
ﬁnal theoretical price of asset A for states where asset A is successful (left
panel) and where B is successful (right panel) (treatment P, pooled over all
probability combinations)
In the next subsection we shall consider possible explanations for those
deviations.
4.4 Possible explanations: no trade, imitation or contrari-
ans?
The observed deviations from the theoretical prices can only be the result of
subjects choosing not to trade or deciding against their private signals. An
obvious candidate explanation for the latter is herd behavior. As explained
in Section 2.2, rational herding is impossible in our framework. However, if
subjects indeed behave like “lemmings”, they would imitate prior decisions
and thus produce herd—like behavior. We ﬁnd, however, that imitation plays
no signiﬁcant role.
The ﬁrst evidence against imitation stems from inspecting Figures 6
through 9, which show that on average actual prices are less extreme than
theoretical prices. Yet, imitation would predict the opposite because if, for
example, an early investor in asset A induced later investors to buy A even
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Figure 7: Distribution of actual prices (upper panel) and theoretical prices
(lower panel) over all periods. (treatment P)
24theoretical price of A
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Figure 8: Average theoretical minus actual price given a theoretical price
(left panel) and average theoretical minus actual signal imbalance ∆ given
a theoretical signal imbalance (right panel) (treatment P, pooled over all
probability combinations)
though they got a b signal, this would quickly drive the actual price above
the theoretical one. Likewise, early investor in B should drive down the
price of A more quickly than the theoretical price since imitation would
yield more buyers of B than justiﬁed by private information.
To check more rigorously for imitation on the individual level we ran a
series of regressions. In treatments P-N we ran logit regressions with the
0-1 variable “choice of A” as endogenous variable. In treatments P we ran
ordered logits with the endogenous variable taking the values 1 (choice of
A), 0 (no trade), and −1 (choice of B).31 We used the following explanatory
variables: ˜ ∆ is the net number of A decisions up to round t,i . e . ˜ ∆ =# A
decisions − # B decisions, which is a one-to-one mapping of the actual price
but is easier to aggregate across probability combinations; dhint is a dummy
variable for the private information of the subjects in question; pred which
measures the number of direct predecessors who chose an identical action
(pred w a sp o s i t i v ei ft h i sa c t i o nw a sA and negative if the action was B).32
In all regressions dhint had the expected sign and was signiﬁcant at the
31Since, from a theoretical point of view, N should never be chosen it is not perfectly
clear whether A, B and N can indeed be ordered. Hence, we also ran multinomial logits
which, however, had no eﬀect on the results which we report below. The independence of
irrelevant alternatives underlying the multinomial model is fulﬁlled.
32The regressions also included a constant. We also ran various test regression, where
we included dummies for diﬀerent probability combinations or dummies if the number
25number in group







































































Figure 9: Average absolute price deviations (left panel) and the fraction of
actual prices within +/-1 of the theoretical price (right panel) (Treatment
P, pooled over all probabilities)
1% level. But there was no trace of imitation as pred was not signiﬁcant
at the 5% level in any of the above regressions. To give imitation the best
shot we also ran regressions separately for ˜ ∆ = −1,0,1 s i n c ef o rt h e s ev a l u e s
imitation cannot be discouraged by extreme prices. But again pred was not
signiﬁcant in any of these regression whereas dhint had the expected sign
and was again signiﬁcant at the 1% level.33
There also does not seem to be herd behavior with respect to no trade
decisions. We have looked at the relative frequency of no-trade decisions de-
pending on the number of predecessors who chose not to trade in treatment
P (pooled over all probability combinations). We ﬁnd that for numbers of
ﬁve or less no-trade predecessors this frequency varies around 20% without
a clear trend. More than ﬁve no-trade predecessors were very rarely ob-
served but if one pools over these observations, no-trade was actually only
chosen in 12% of cases. That there is no herding in N is also conﬁrmed in
a regression analysis.
of A or B predecessors is greater than a certain threshold. None of these changes had
implications for the reported results.
33In treatment BHW, we ran a logit regression to explain ”choice of A” through dhint,
dummies for the diﬀerent probability combinations, a constant and a variable herd which
takes on the value 1 (-1) if a subject should rationally choose A (B) irrespective of his
private signal and which is equal to zero otherwise (see Table 2). In contrast to the results
above, we ﬁnd that in the absence of a ﬂexible market price, the herding variable herd is
signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
26If imitation is not the right story to explain the deviations between the
theoretical and actual price, what is? We suggest a story based on contrarian
behavior which can be justiﬁed by a regression to the mean argument. As
explained above, we say that a subject is a contrarian if he trades against
his signal and against the market, or equivalently if he receives an a (b)
signal at a price for A which is strictly above (below) the a priori price, i.e.,
10 times the a priori probability for A, and deviates from his signal to buy
B (A) instead. Such contrarian behavior can only be (ex post) rational if
the trader is convinced that prior traders irrationally drove the price to an
extreme.
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Figure 10: Average rationality (upper panels) and average buying against
the own signal (right panels) given an a signal (left panels) or a b signal (right
panels) across actual price of A (Treatment P, probability combination 55-
60, more extreme prices than those shown are omitted due to a low number
of observations.)
Figure 10 gives evidence in favor of contrarian behavior. The four pan-
27els show averages for following one’s signal and for trading against one’s
signal for treatment P+D and probabilities 55-60.34 The higher the price,
the more likely subjects are to trade against their signals and the lower
rationality. Average rationality rat drops from over 70% at low prices to
just above 10% at high prices. While own shows exactly the opposite trend,
the propensity not to trade remains roughly constant at around 20% across
prices. Contrarian behavior is also strongly suggested by Figures 6 through
8. These ﬁndings are conﬁrmed in our regression analysis. In contrast to
theory, ˜ ∆ has a negative eﬀect on the probability of choosing asset A at a
1%s i g n i ﬁcance level in all regressions we ran.35
The question arises, however, whether it is a good idea to be a con-
trarian? At ﬁrst sight it seems to be the case that if contrarian behavior
is common, assets above the a priori prices are likely to be undervalued at
current prices and should in fact be bought. We will present two possible
explanations for this apparent puzzle. The ﬁrst is purely based on contrarian
behavior, the second on random behavior by some traders and regression to
the mean.
The ﬁrst explanation is best illustrated by an actual price path in our
experiment (see Figure 11). Suppose the price of A falls below the a priori
price and there is one contrarian. This price gap is preserved in all future
rounds unless someone else deviates from his signal. Suppose next that due
to a series of a signals the price of A rises above the a priori price just as
in the example. A trader who anticipated this, would actually be better
oﬀ being a contrarian in this later rounds. Thus, contrarian behavior is
compatible with overshooting, which is sometimes observed in the data (see
Figure 6).
The second explanation assumes that some traders behave like noise
traders, in particular, they choose A and B with equal probabilities. This
implies that whenever the actual price is very high or very low, it is likely
that this was driven by noise traders. In other words, whenever the actual
price is extreme, the theoretical price is likely to be less extreme. Vice
versa, whenever the theoretical price is extreme, the actual price is likely to
be less extreme, which is simply a regression to the mean argument. Given
that traders anticipate the random behavior of noise traders, they should
be contrarians because a low price for A yields a buying opportunity even
if the own private information is favoring B. Given that there are some
contrarians among the traders, actual prices will on average be less extreme
34Other treatments and probability combinations look similar.
35Cipriani and Guarino (2002) run similar regressions. In the absence of transaction
costs, they do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of e ∆. In their transaction costs treatment, e ∆
h a st h ee x p e c t e ds i g na n di ss i g n i ﬁcant at the 5%-level.
28number in group
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Figure 11: Example of an actual price path (treatment P-N, probability
combination 51-55)
than theoretical ones, just as observed in our data (see Figure 7).
4.5 Does it pay to be a contrarian?
The previous subsection shows that contrarian behavior has at least the
potential to be proﬁtable. But was it actually proﬁtable? A ﬁrst aggregate
look at the data suggests that this was not the case. Table 6 lists average
proﬁts (excluding the ﬁxed payment of 11 in the price treatments) of subjects
depending on whether subjects were rational or not. In all cases, rationality
yields higher average proﬁts. The last column of Table 6 contains Pearson
correlation coeﬃcients between rat and proﬁts. All correlation coeﬃcients
are positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level.36
We say a subjects is a potential contrarian if he faces a price for asset
S strictly higher than the a priori price and receives a signal in favor of S,
where S = A,B. In Table 7, we compare the average proﬁts of contrarians
with that of potential contrarians who did not become contrarians either
because they followed their signal or because they did not trade at all. In
treatment groups P and P+T contrarians did worse than both other groups.
However, in P-N contrarians fared better than rational subjects.
36This also holds in BHW and BHW+AS. On average, rational players earned 6.1 in
BHW and BHW+AS whereas irrational players earned 4.4 in BHW and 3.4 in BHW+AS.
29Table 6: Proﬁts and rationality
av. proﬁts of subjects classiﬁed as
treatment rat = 1 rat = 0 corr. coeﬀ.
P 1.3 −0.50 .20∗∗
P-N 1.0 −0.40 .13∗∗
P+T0.1 1.1 −0.40 .18∗∗
P+T0.5 0.6 −0.50 .13∗∗
Note: pooled over all probability combinations, proﬁts exclude ﬁxed payments and
the proﬁt from the price bet, ∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 7: Proﬁts of (potential) contrarians
proﬁts of potential contrarians who were...
treatment contrarians rational no—traders
P −0.60 .90
P-N 0.1 −0.5 −
P+T0.1 −0.70 .20
P+T0.5 −0.90 .50
Note: pooled over all probability combinations, proﬁts exclude ﬁxed payments and
the proﬁt from the price bet.
30It seems plausible that contrarian behavior is sensible if actual prices
are extreme. To check this, we compare the proﬁt of a contrarian with the
counterfactual proﬁt he would have received had he played according to
theory. Since pt =(10- price of B), it is straightforward to show that, in the
absence of transaction costs, the counterfactual payoﬀ is always (−1)t i m e s
the actual proﬁt. Figure 12 shows the average proﬁts of contrarians across
actual prices for our main probability combination 55-60 in treatments P-N
(left panel) and P (right panel). For extreme prices a contrarian is actually
more successful than a counterfactual, rational subject would be.
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Figure 12: Proﬁts of contrarians across prices in treatments P-N (left panel)
and P (right panel) (probability combination 55-60, counterfactual proﬁts
are (-1) times the displayed proﬁts.
For other probability combinations the evidence is more mixed. If we
pool over all probabilities and consider prices that deviate by more than
two from the a priori price, we get the results presented in Table 8. In
treatment P, contrarians always do worse than their counterfactuals whereas
in treatment P-N contrarians do better for prices that are more than two
away from p0.
4.6 Two error models to explain contrarian behavior
As discussed in Section 4.4 contrarian behavior can be optimal if traders
believe that others make mistakes. In this subsection, we explicitly incorpo-
rate the possibility that subjects are aware that others make mistakes. We
shall do so under two diﬀerent assumptions.
31Table 8: Contrarians’ proﬁts in diﬀerent price regions
pt − p0 ≥ 22 ≥ pt − p0 ≥− 2 pt − p0 ≤− 2
P −0.3 −0.7 −0.6
P-N 0.4 −0.20 .9
Note: pooled over all probability combinations, proﬁts exclude ﬁxed payments and
the proﬁt from the price bet
In error model (a) it is assumed that each subjects believes that each of
his predecessors followed his signal (erroneously traded against his signal)
with a constant probability x (1 − x). The average rationality in error
model (a) is denoted by rat-s, where we call an agent “rational” if he is a
Bayesian with respect to the decision history, a given x and his signal. We
assume x =0 .70 which resembles the fraction of subjects in treatments P
and P-N who followed their own signal given they chose A or B. However
the model is very robust to the exact speciﬁcation of x. Error model (a) is
rather simplistic in that it is assumed that (i) subjects neglect the fact that
predecessors might have taken into account the errors of their predecessors,
and (ii) the error probability is constant across price levels whereas Figure
10 clearly shows that average rationality is decreasing in the price level.
Error model (b) relaxes these two assumptions: based on the concept
of quantal response equilibrium of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1997) and
analogous to Anderson and Holt (1997), error parameters are estimated re-
cursively for each round t taking into account that predecessors have reacted
to possible earlier errors. Hence, this model assumes a full level of reason-
ing.37
The estimation is done in the following way: it is assumed that subjects
decide according to a logistic model with independent shocks to the expected
payoﬀ diﬀerence between assets A and B. For reasons of tractability, we
only estimate this error model for treatment group P-N.F o r m a l l y ,f o re a c h
subject the probability for buying asset A is given by







i ) is the expected proﬁt of buying asset A (B). The error
parameter βt characterizes the sensitivity to payoﬀ diﬀerences: subjects buy
randomly if βt → 0 but play rational best replies if βt →∞ . Since expected
37K¨ ubler and Weizs¨ acker (2001) show in an experiment that is similar to treatment
BHW that full reasoning of this type will typically not be observed.
32Table 9: Average rationaliy under diﬀerent error models
rat rat-s rat-β
P 0.55 0.59 -
P-N 0.66 0.69 0.67
Note: pooled over all probability combinations.
proﬁts in round 1 only depend on the realization of the signal, the estimation
of β1 is straightforward. The estimation of subsequent error parameters is
more involved in that expected proﬁts in a certain round depend on the
error parameters of all previous rounds which implies path-dependency.
To estimate β2,w eﬁrst calculate the probability P(D1 = S|s)t h a ti n
round 1 the subject chose asset S in case he received signal s ∈ {a,b} taking
the error parameter β1 into account. In a second step, this information can
be used to calculate
P(D1 = A|A)=P(D1|a) · P(a|A)+P(D1|b) · P(b|A).
Hence, if D1 = A the posterior that asset A is successful is given by
P(A|D1 = A)=
P(D1 = A|A) · P(A)
P(D1 = A|A) · P(A)+P(D1 = A|B) · P(B)
.
Combining this with private signals, one can calculate expected proﬁts for
second round players. With those, β2 can be estimated yielding a new prior
for player 3, and so on for all subsequent rounds.38 Average rationality in
error model (b) is denoted rat-β.
Even though requirements on rationality and depths of reasoning are
quite diﬀerent in the two models, Table 9 shows that the average rationality
levels are remarkably similar.39 We believe that this is due to the fact
that errors do not change the optimal actions for most prices even though
expected proﬁts do change.
This can be seen in Figure 13 which shows average expected proﬁts of
buying asset A given an a or b signal depending on the assumptions with
38In an iterative process, we also estimated a constant error parameter β across all
rounds: in each iteration, expected proﬁts were calculated by using the error parameter
obtained in the previous estimation, and we observed convergence of β after approximately
20 iterations. The results from this (simpliﬁed) logistic error model are qualitatively the
same as those reported.
39Note that while the standard model without errors is nested both in error models (a)
and (b), error model (a) is not nested in error model (b), and hence rat-s > rat-β,a si n
P-N,i sp o s s i b l e .
33respect to errors of predecessors (treatment P-N 55-60).40 In the standard
model, where agents hold the belief that all agents follow their signal, it is
always optimal to follow one’s signal as well. Not so with error model (a)
or (b): Figure 13 shows that at low or moderate prices for asset A (B),
agents should optimally follow an a (b) signal but at high prices contrarian
behavior is optimal.
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Figure 13: Average expected net proﬁts of buying asset A given an a signal
(left panel) or a b signal (right panel) for the standard model, error model
(a) and error model (b) (treatment P-N, probability combination 55-60)
Given Figure 13, it is not surprising that average rationality at moderate
prices is similar under all three deﬁnitions of rationality. Only at very high
and very low prices rationality increases if one allows for the possibility of
errors (see Figure 14).41
These results have implications for the discussion about ”noise traders”
in market microstructure models. As discussed earlier, in a model where
there are only informed traders and where a market maker sets a bid-ask
spread, the no—trade theorem would apply. In order to ensure that even in
t h ep r e s e n c eo faz e r o - p r o ﬁt condition for the market maker market failure
is avoided, most market microstructure model introduce noise traders ad
40Note that expected proﬁts in error model (b) are path-dependent, and hence they are
not necessarily equal for players which encounter the same realized price.
41Logit regressions of rat-s and rat-β on a constant and the price deviation from the a
priori expected value of A reveal that the price deviation is not signiﬁcant for rat-s and
has a small negative impact on rat-β,w h i c hi s ,h o w e v e r ,j u s ts i g n i ﬁcant at the 5% level.
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Figure 14: Average rationality in the standard model (rat), error model (a)
(rat-s) and error model (b) (rat-β) across prices in treatments P-N (left
panel) and P (right panel) (probability combination 55-60)
hoc.42
First, our results suggest that “noise” seems to emerge automatically due
to the irrationality of some of the decisions of the traders. This becomes es-
pecially obvious in our full information treatment BHW+AS where, pooled
over all probability combinations, average rationality is still only 72%. This
observation together with the fact that even under the error models ratio-
nality does not exceed this value suggests that the problem is not so much
extracting the relevant information from the decision of predecessors but
rather processing it correctly. Second, our data provide support for the
hypothesis that each agent decides rationally with a certain probability as
opposed to the hypothesis that some of the subjects always decide rationally
while others always decide irrationally. To check for this, 240 of our sub-
jects played three times BHW+AS, which does not require assumptions with
respect to the rationality of predecessors. Figure 15 depicts how many of
these subjects made zero, one, two, or three rational decisions. A two—sided
Kolmogorov—Smirnov test reveals that this distribution is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from a distribution which would result if each of these subjects had
42To justify the presence of noise traders it has been argued that (rational) noise traders
act due to liquidity or hedging needs (see e.g. Ausubel, 1990) or due to incentives arising
from optimal delegation contracts for portfolio managers (see e.g., Dow and Gorton, 1997).
Following Black (1986) there is a strand of the literature in which noise traders are seen as
traders which trade on noise as if it was information or as agents who just act randomly.
35always decided rationally with probability 0.7 (as assumed in error model
(a)).
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Figure 15: Distribution of the number of rational decisions made by subjects
who played BHW+AS three times (pooled over all probability combinations)
4.7 Transaction costs
An important question for ﬁnancial markets is how transaction costs might
inﬂuence the eﬃciency of markets.43 Treatments with transaction costs were
identical to P+D except that traders had to pay a cost of 0.1 (in the
P+D+T0.1 and Pe+D+T0.1 treatments) or a cost of 0.5 (in the P+D+T0.5
and Pe+D+T0.5 treatments). If all traders are rational this can imply that
not trading is rational independent of the signal.
Table 10 shows the relationship between transaction costs and rationality
and as expected, transaction costs make the choice of N more frequent, 23%
and 28%, respectively, rather than 19% without transaction costs. However,
only 3% of the no trade decisions are rational if subjects have to pay a small
cost of 0.1. This percentage increases to 18% for large transaction cost (0.5).
Putting it diﬀerently: if transaction cost are 0.1 less than 1% of all subjects
rationally choose N, but if they are 0.5 over 5% rationally choose N.T h i s
43In a related model, Lee (1998) shows that herding and informtional avalanches can
occur in the presence of transaction costs.
36Table 10: Transaction costs and rationality
rat against own signal no trade rat. if N
P 0.55 0.25 0.190
P+T0.1 0.52 0.25 0.23 0.03
P+T0.5 0.50 0.23 0.28 0.18
Note: pooled over all probability combinations.
shows that the increase in N between the transaction cost treatments is
primarily driven by rational subjects.44
However, this does not explain the diﬀerence between average no trading
in P and P+T. One may conclude from this that transaction costs have
an emotional eﬀect. Indeed, in the transaction cost treatments we ﬁnd the
only signiﬁcant eﬀect of the stage of the task (whether a task was the ﬁrst,
second, or third a subject performed in), which allows for an interesting in-
terpretation. P+T treatments were only played on stages 2 and 3. We ﬁnd
as t r o n ge ﬀect that N is chosen more frequently when a subject encountered
a P+T treatment on stage 3 for the ﬁr s tt i m ea n dp l a y e dP without trans-
action cost on stage 2.45 The obvious interpretation is that subjects felt
compelled to react to the change in the rules by overreacting to transaction
costs. Whereas when P+T treatments appeared already on stage 2, no such
overreaction could be observed and there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
average N for P and P+T on this stage.
4.8 Is the price perceived as a martingale?
As shown in Section 2.2, the theoretical price in the model without trans-
action cost is a martingale with respect to public information. Without
transaction costs, theoretical prices will converge to the true value, and
prices are semi—strong eﬃcient. From our previous discussion we already
know that realized prices in our experiment strongly diverged from the the-
oretical prediction. However, for an eﬃcient market it is not only important
to see whether prices eﬃciently incorporate all information but also whether
subjects perceive the price to be a martingale.
If all players are rational, they know that the price tomorrow reﬂects
44Cipriani and Guarino (2002) consider larger transaction costs of 0.9 and report that
in this case more than 80% of no trade-decision are consistent with rationality.
45The frequency of N is 0.11 in P+T 0.1 on stage 2 but 0.26 on stage 3. Likewise, in
P+T 0.5 it is 0.21 on stage 2 and 0.30 on stage 3. Both diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the
1% level of a MWU test.
37their decision Dt in this period, i.e. they know that E(A|Ht,D t)=pt+1.
Given that a rational trader only buys in the direction of his signal, the
price tomorrow is E(A|Ht,s). The law of iterated expectations implies that
t h eb e s tg u e s so fat r a d e rf o rt h ep r i c epT+1 after the last trader has decided
must also be E(A|Ht,s)=10P(A|Ht,s).46 As explained in Section 3.1 we
asked subjects to enter a bet ˆ pT+1 on the endprice which was remunerated
according to equation (1). If the price is correctly perceived as a martingale,
we should ﬁnd that the price bet just equals the lead price, i.e., that ˆ pT+1 =
pt+1.
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Figure 16: Distribution of the diﬀerence between lead price and price bet
(treatment P, pooled over all probability combinations)
A n di n d e e d ,i nt r e a t m e n tP 15% of bets equal exactly the lead price
pt+1:47 Figure 16 shows the distribution of the diﬀerence between lead price
and price bet. Nearly 30% of all price bets are within a 0.3 interval of the
lead price. Allowing for deviations of up to 1, increases this number to 64%.
Figure 17 disaggregates Figure 16 with respect to the decision taken
and with respect to whether the decision was rational (lower panels) or not
(upper panels). While the rationality of the decision (rat) does not seem
46Note that if, in line with error model (a) of Section 4.6, subjects assume that all
of their successors follow their respective signal with a constant probability, the price
remains a martingale as the expected price process in such an error model is equivalent
to the expected price process in a Glosten and Milgrom (1985) world with noise traders.
47Even if we exclude subjects who chose N this ratio is 14%.
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Figure 17: Distribution of (lead price-price bet) depending on the choice
(A/B/N) and the rationality rat (yes/no) (treatments P,p o o l e do v e ra l l
probability combinations)
to have an impact on the price bet, the decision itself has a substantial
eﬀect. Even though the mode is at 0 in all cases, on average subjects tend
to underestimate the impact of their decision on the price and place a bet
which is between the current and the lead price (almost 55% of subjects
place a bet which is in the interval between the current and the lead price).
To see how price betting behavior changes over time, we display in Figure
18 the average of the absolute values of the deviations between bet and lead
price, |ˆ pT+1 − pt+1| and the absolute values of deviations between price bet
and endprice, |ˆ pT+1−pT+1| across positions in the groups. While the former
varies insigniﬁcantly around 1, the latter is clearly decreasing over time,
which implies that the accuracy of prediction of endprices increases over
time. Yet even in the last round, the average deviation remains above 0.8. It
seems that traders have diﬃculties to correctly evaluate the inﬂuence of their
own action on the price. Despite this, we interpret our data as moderate
support for the hypothesis that subjects understand the martingale property
39of prices.
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Figure 18: Absolute deviations of the price bid from the lead price (|ˆ pT+1 −
pt+1|)a n df r o mt h eﬁnal price (|ˆ pT+1 −pT+1|) (treatment P, pooled over all
probability combinations)
4.9 The inﬂuence of personal characteristics
With the large number of participants in our experiment it is possible to
investigate the behavior of a variety of subgroups. For the price treatments,
Table 11 compares average rationality and proﬁts of male subjects, female
subjects, subjects who are current or former students (“college”), subjects
who have never attended college (“no college”), subjects holding a Ph.D.
and current Ph.D. students. To test for diﬀerences, we ran logit regressions
at the individual level to explain the rationality variable rat by dummies for
the above subgroups. Controlling for the duration of play, the age of the
subject and its position in the group, we ﬁnd that neither the sex of the
subject nor the college dummy are signiﬁcant at reasonable levels. However,
there is evidence that the 45% of our subjects studying for or holding a Ph.D.
had a statistically signiﬁcant, positive eﬀect on rat (with p—values of 0.01
and 0.066, respectively).48 Even though average proﬁts vary considerably
48Controlling for the ﬁeld of studies reveals that these eﬀects are mainly driven by
Ph.D.’s and Ph.D. students from the sciences, medicine and engineering. Surprisingly,
there is no signiﬁcant Ph.D. eﬀect in economics. We also included a dummy to reﬂect
40Table 11: Rationality and proﬁts of subgroups in price treatments
male female college no college Ph.D. Ph.D. student overall
rat 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.58 0.58 0.56
proﬁt 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.55 0.48 0.44 0.38
N o t e :t r e a t m e n t sP ,P - N ,P + T 0.1 and P+T0.5, pooled over all probability
combinations, proﬁts exclude ﬁxed payments and the proﬁt from the price bet.
across the categories under consideration, a regression analysis shows that
these diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
As a large part of our subject pool had some university education, we
asked subjects for their major ﬁeld of study as it should be interesting
whether there are diﬀerences in behavior. And indeed, there are some diﬀer-
ences. First, we look at the full-information treatment BHW+AS where one
should ignore the decisions of others. In this treatment, the skill of judging
the irrationality of others is irrelevant while the ability to deal with probabil-
ities is decisive. In Figure 19 we see that the group of mathematicians per-
form best followed by engineers, computer scientists and economists. Worst
are linguists, biologists, lawyers and most of all pharmacists.49
However, in the price treatments rationality rat is not necessarily a virtue
if others are irrational. What matters are the proﬁts subjects made through
their choices. Figure 20 depicts average rationality (rat) and proﬁts (again
excluding ﬁxed payments and payoﬀs from the price bet) for selected ﬁelds of
study. As expected from Figure 19, with respect to rat physicists and math-
ematicians perform above average. Business and (surprisingly) economics
students are slightly below average and psychologists performed worst. How-
ever, if one looks at proﬁts the ranking is almost exactly reversed. Physicists
and mathematicians do much worse than psychologists and economists. Fig-
ure 20 suggests that sometimes an intuition for the partly irrational behavior
of others seems to be more important than being able to apply Bayes’ rule.50
4.10 Are consultants diﬀerent?
Ac o m m o n( a n dj u s t i ﬁed) critique against experiments in economics is that,
with few exceptions, they rely on a subject pool consisting only of economics
whether a subject had provided an invalid email address (see Footnote 20). This dummy
is not signiﬁcant.
49Note that in this treatment expected proﬁt are strictly increasing in rat.
50However, regressions show that the diﬀerences, despite being substantial on average,





























Figure 19: Rationality in treatment BHW+AS (pooled over all probability
combinations, only ﬁelds with more than 10 participants are included, overall
average of rat is 0.72)
students. While this can be changed with relatively little eﬀort, the reliance
on students in general is often dictated by ﬁnancial and practical constraints.
This makes it all the more important that outside validity is checked when
one has the rare opportunity to conduct experiments with professionals in
business. We were able to conduct the experiment on the same platform
with 267 consultants of an international consultancy.51 Do their results
diﬀer? Figure 21 (left panel) shows average rational behavior (rat) pooled
over P and P-N and probability combination 55-60 (which was the only one
played in the control treatment with consultants). Since originally we used
ad i ﬀerent text version in the control experiment, we used this text version
also in 16 groups of the main experiment.52 For both text versions the
consultants are slightly more rational but none of the diﬀerences is signiﬁcant
at the 5% level of a MWU—test (two—sided). Even though inspection by
eye-sight would suggest that average proﬁts (see Figure 21, right panel) are
51The groups size in this control experiment was always limited to 10 and sometimes 5.
However, testing revealed that this has no signiﬁcant eﬀect.
52In the control experiment the number of groups with the old text (text1) was 18 and
the number of groups with the new text (text2) was 6. The new text was more precise
about the independence of the investment bankers’ tips. In the general phase the two
diﬀerent text versions did not yield signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results, and hence the groups















Figure 20: Rationality and proﬁts for selected ﬁelds of study (treatments P,
P-N and P+T, all probability combinations, proﬁts exclude ﬁxed payments
and payoﬀs from the price bet)
quite diﬀerent in the control experiment, MWU tests show that none of the
diﬀerences are signiﬁcant. Thus, the control group of consultants does not
behave and fare signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from our general subject pool.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present results of a large scale internet experiment based
on a sequential asset market with privately informed traders. Avery and
Zemsky (1998) predict that in such markets herd behavior should not be
observed because all trade decisions are immediately incorporated into the
market price which, consequently, reﬂects all public information. And in-
deed, as predicted, we do not ﬁnd evidence for herding or imitative behavior
in our experiment. However, in contrast to theory, subjects do not always
follow their private information but frequently act as contrarians, i.e., they
trade against the market and their own signal. To explain this behavior,
we study two error models which allow for the possibility that subjects have
doubts about the rationality of others and consequently mistrust their de-
cisions. These error models are able to rationalize contrarian behavior at
relatively low or high prices. In fact, from an ex-post perspective contrarian
behavior was justiﬁed at such prices in treatment P-N because it yielded

















Figure 21: Average rationality rat (left panel) and proﬁts (right panel) for
the general subject pool (base) and the control experiment with consul-
tants (C) given the old (text1) and new (text2) version of the instructions
(treatments P and P-N, probability combination 55-60, proﬁts exclude ﬁxed
payments and proﬁts from the price bet).
higher payoﬀs. Both error models produce results which are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from each other. This is quite surprising given their very diﬀerent
requirements with respect to the depth of reasoning of subjects. Further-
more, in the standard model as well as in the error models, rationality seems
to be “bounded” by the level subjects achieved in the full—information treat-
ment BHW+AS.
Our experiment complements a large empirical literature on herding,
and, like the bulk of this literature, our results suggest that herd behav-
ior driven by informational externalities does not seem to be an important
force in ﬁnancial markets. To the contrary, one could even argue that the
observed contrarian behavior, which we ﬁnd sometimes to be proﬁtable, has
a stabilizing eﬀect as it implies that agents tend to diﬀerentiate their invest-
ments from those of their predecessors. Of course, this does not rule out
herding in ﬁnancial markets based on explanations other than purely infor-
mation based ones, as for example reputation concerns, payoﬀ externalities,
etc.. To disentangle these factors is an important task for future empirical
and experimental research.
44Appendix: Instructions
Once connected to our website www.a-oder-b.de,t h e r ew a sﬁrst a general
overview on the experiment (screen 1 below). Then, subjects where asked
to provide some personal information (screen 2 below). Only if all informa-
tion was provided, subjects were allowed to continue and learn their player
number (screen 3 below). Subsequently, the actual experiment began and
Screen 4 below provides an example of the ﬁrst of three rounds (treatment
BHW). Screen 5 below provides an example of a price treatment played in
the second round (treatment P+D), and screen 6 displays the text for the
price bet. Round 3 had the same basic structure, and therefore we omit an
example of this round.
Screen 1: Introduction
A game-theoretic experiment Are you a good decision-maker? We chal-
lenge you! Professor J. Oechssler together with the “Laboratorium for Ex-
perimental Research in Economics” at the University of Bonn aims to test
various scientiﬁc theories through the online—experiment “A-or-B”. Finan-
cial support is provided by the consultancy McKinsey & Company.
Attractive prizes By participating in the experiment you support the
scientiﬁcw o r ko ft h eU n i v e r s i t yo fB o n n .A tt h es a m et i m ey o up a r t i c i p a t e
in a lottery for a total of 11,000 Euros which are distributed among 11 of
the participants. The more thorough your decisions are, the greater your
chances of winning. Of course you will also need some luck. The game takes
approximately 15m i n u t e s .
The experiment The experiment consists of three rounds. In every round
you’ll be assigned to a group and you - as well as every other member of
your group - will have to take an investment decision. Without background
knowledge the decision would be pure speculation. However, all players in
a group will receive tips by investment bankers. Each group member gets a
tip from a diﬀerent investment banker. The investment bankers are expe-
rienced but can’t make perfect predictions. The reliability of the tip is the
same for every investment banker. As additional information, each player
can observe the decisions of his predecessors in his group.
45For each correct decision you will earn a predetermined amount of Lotto—
Euros. After the third round, the Lotto—Euros you earned will be converted
into lottery tickets on a one-to-one basis. Hence, the better your investment
decisions, the higher your chances of winning. The experiment ends on June
7, 2002. The winners of the lottery will be notiﬁed after June 16, 2002 via
ordinary mail. Now, let’s begin the experiment!
Screen 2: Request of personal information
Welcome to the online-experiment ”A-or-B”. Please note that you can only
play once. Before the game starts, we would like to ask you for some per-
sonal information. Of course, the results of the game will be kept separately
from your personal information and will be analyzed anonymously. The mail
address is only needed to notify the winners. Information on your ﬁeld of
studies, age, sex, etc. are only used for scientiﬁc purposes. Detailed infor-
mation regarding data protection may be found here [Link].
[Data entry ﬁelds for last name, ﬁrst name, address, email, student sta-
tus, ﬁeld of studies, year of studies, Ph.D. status, age and sex]
Screen 3: Player number and incentives
Thank you for providing the requested information. Your player number
is: [player number]. Your player number, the number of lottery tickets you
won, and additional information regarding the experiment will be automat-
ically send to your email address after you have completed the experiment.
In this phase of the experiment, a total of 40,000 lottery tickets will be
distributed, and 5 participants can win 1000 Euros each. Every lottery
ticket has the same chance of winning.
Screen 4: Round 1
You have to make an important investment decision: there are two risky
assets (A and B). Only one asset will be successful and pay out 10 Lotto-
Euros (LE). The other asset will yield no proﬁt at all. The successful asset
was determined randomly before the ﬁrst player of this group played. Hence,
t h es a m ea s s e tis successful for all players in your group. Without additional
information you can rely on the fact that in 55% of cases asset A is suc-
cessful while in 45% of cases asset B is successful.
46Each participant in your group faces the same problem as you do: he has to
choose between the assets and receives a tip from his respective investment
banker. The reliability of the tips is the same for all investment bankers,
and the tips of the investment bankers are independent of each other. The
tip of each investment banker is correct in 60% of the cases,i . e . i n100
cases where asset A (respectively B) is successful, in 60 cases the investment
banker gives the correct tip A (respectively B) while in 40 cases the tip is
not correct. The tip of your investment banker is: [B]
While each participant only knows the tip of his own investment banker,
you - as every player in your group - can observe the decisions of the respec-
tive predecessors. Which players are assigned to which group is random and
will diﬀer from round to round. You are the [4th] investor in this group.
One after another, your predecessors have made the following decisions:
Investor no. 1 23
Decision B A B What do you choose? [A] or [B].
Was the decision diﬃcult? Independent of your decision, what do you think
is the probability of A being the successful asset? [] %.
After the third round you’ll ﬁnd out whether your decision was correct. Let’s
move on the next round.
Screen 5: Round 2
In this round you receive an endowment of 11 Lotto-Euro. The basic struc-
ture remains the same as in round 1. (In case you want to review the central
features of round 1 please click [here].) This time you have to decide in which
of the two risky shares (A or B) you want to invest. Only one share will
yield a proﬁto f10 Lotto-Euro, the other one will be worthless. Share A is
successful in 55% of all cases, share B in 45% of all cases. As in round 1
the successful share was determined by chance before the ﬁrst player of this
group played.
In contrast to round 1, you - as every player in the group - have to pay
t h ec u r r e n ts h a r ep r i c eif you decide to invest in a share. Share prices are
determined by supply and demand such that outside investors, who can ob-
serve the history of trades but not the tips given by the investment bankers,
have no incentive to trade, i.e. an outside investor could not expect to proﬁt
from buying or selling one of the shares [only in treatments e: ... because
the price of share A (B) is equal to the conditional expected value of A (B)
47given the decisions of all your predecessors]. The role of outside investors is
played by the computer.
As in round 1, every participant receives a tip from his investment banker
which is correct in 60% of all cases. This time, your investment banker rec-
ommends: [A]
The current price of share A is 6.47 LE. The current price of share B is
3.53 LE. The proﬁt in this round is given by:
your endowment (11 LE)
- price of the respective share
+s t o c kp r o ﬁt( 10o r0L E )
You can also decide not to invest. In this case, you just keep your endow-
ment of 11 LE.
Like your predecessors, you can observe the price history and the history
of decisions in your group. You are the [2nd] investor in this group. Your
predecessors in this group were facing the same problems as you, and one
after another they have purchased the shares shown below at the price valid
at that point in time:
Investor no. 1
Decision A
Price of A 5.50
Price of B 4.50 What do you choose? [A], [B] or [No trade].
Independent of your decision, what do you think is the probability of A
being the successful asset? [ ] %.
After the third round you’ll ﬁnd out whether your decision was correct.
Screen 6: Round 2 (price bet)
Now that you have made your decision, you have the possibility to earn
an extra 5 LE by correctly predicting the price of A which is in place after
the last player in this group has made his decision (but before the true value
of the shares is revealed). If you not perfectly predict this price the extra 5
LE will be reduced by 1 LE for each LE your prediction deviates from the
ﬁnal price. In the worst case you will not receive additional LE. There are
still [18] players deciding after you in this group.
As explained above, the price of share A is determined by supply and de-
48mand such that outside investors, who can observe the history of decisions
but not the tips, have no incentive to trade. To refresh your memory, you
ﬁnd the history of prices and decisions below:
Investor no. 1
Decision A
Price of A 5.50
Price of B 4.50 Final price of share A: [ ]
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